European Centre for Financial Law

Research to fuel public debate


For a proactive attitude of the standard-setting authorities on Market Abuse Regulation – Alain Pietrancosta, Director of the OEDF

Centre Conference on 29 January 2020 on the revision of the Market Abuse Regulation – Speech by Mr Alain Pietrancosta, Director of the OEDF

Position of the European Centre for Financial Law on shareholder activism – Alain Pietrancosta, Scientific Director of the OEDF

Centre Breakfast on shareholder activism on December 18, 2019 – Alain Pietrancosta, Scientific Director of the OEDF

“There is today in France a formidable compendium of knowledge and skills insufficiently exploited in the field of financial law” – Fabrice Seiman, President of the OEDF

Centre Breakfast on shareholder activism on December 18, 2019 – Speech by Mr. Fabrice Seiman, President of the OEDF

Faire s’exprimer la contestation d’une politique sociale sans porter atteinte à l’intérêt de la société et au bon fonctionnement du marché – Alain Pietrancosta, Directeur de l’OEDF

Déjeuner de l’Observatoire sur l’activisme actionnarial du 18 décembre 2019 – Allocution de Monsieur Alain Pietrancosta, Directeur de l’OEDF

CSDR – “We need a targeted review” – Robert Ophèle

Speech by Robert Ophèle, Chairman of the AMF
ECSDA, Annual Conference
20 November 2019 – Brussels

“Sustainable finance, a fad or a springboard for tomorrow’s economy”.

Speech by Robert Ophèle, Chairman of the AMF
The 2019 AMF Annual Conference
Thursday, November 14, 2019 – Cambon Pavilion

Corporate governance and shareholders engagement: the new normal conference

Speech by Robert Ophèle, Chairman of the AMF
Law & Growth Conference
Friday, October 18, 2019

For a European approach to law enforcement – Robert Ophèle

12th Colloquium of the AMF Enforcement Committee
Closing speech by Robert Ophèle, Chairman of the AMF – Friday 4 October 2019

Upcoming events

august, 2020

Thematic articles

Network-Sensitive Financial Regulation

Shocks that hit part of the financial system, such as the subprime mortgage market in 2007, can propagate through a complex network of interconnections among financial and non-financial institutions. As the financial crisis of 2007-2009 has shown, the consequences for the entire economy of such systemic risk materializing can be catastrophic. Following the crisis, economists and policymakers have become increasingly aware that the structure of the financial system is a key determinant of systemic risk. A wide consensus now exists among them that network theory is the natural framework for studying systemic risk. Yet, most of the existing rules in financial regulation are still “atomistic,” in that they fail to incorporate the fact that each individual institution is part of a wider network. This article shows that policies building upon insights from network theory (network-sensitive policies) can address systemic risk more effectively than traditional atomistic policies, also in areas where an atomistic approach would seem natural, such as the corporate governance of systemically important financial institutions. In particular, we consider four prescriptions for the governance of systemically important institutions (one on directors’ liability, two on executive compensation and one on failing financial institutions’ shareholders appraisal rights in mergers) and show how making them network-sensitive would both increase their effectiveness in taming systemic risk and better calibrate their impact on individual institutions.

Why Do Investment Funds Have Special Securities Regulation ?

For almost every type of company, the United States has just one body of securities regulation. Pet stores, hospitals, for-profit universities, and iron mines all have to comply with the same securities laws in basically the same way. There is, however, one important exception: investment funds. Mutual funds, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds have their own special body of securities regulation that applies in place of or in addition to the regular securities laws that apply to other types of companies. Why? This 7,000-word essay, prepared for publication in the Research Handbook of Mutual funds, contemplates a number of possible answers and concludes that the most distinctive and legally salient feature of an investment fund is its structure. Investment funds divide their assets from their managements in much more radical ways than other types of companies. The surprising implication is that for purposes of regulation, an investment fund’s investments are much less important than its pattern of organization.

O Tell Me The Truth About Bail-In : Theory and Practice

This Article analyzes the functioning of the European regulatory approach to the crisis of credit institutions, in the framework of EU banking supervision and in light of its early applications, with a special focus on bail-in. We investigate how the new resolution mechanisms — rooted in the principle of private sector involvement in banking restructurings — have inter-played with legal and institutional contexts still characterized by an attitude to bail-out rescues and by non-harmonized national insolvency rules. We show how and well-experimented restructuring tools have influenced the application of the new ones and, in many cases, have emphasized the defects, pitfalls and inconsistencies of the new regime, suggesting paths for reform.

The Article is organized as follows. Part II sets out a summary of the common regime applicable to credit institutions within the EU, based on harmonized requirements for capital and liquidity. Part III focuses on the pre-crisis and crisis tools, as spelled out in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (“BRRD”), in coordination with bordering regulatory areas, such as the regimes applicable to the liquidation of insolvent banks and State aids in the context of banking rescues.

After a brief comparison with the US system (Part IV), we dwell, in Part V, on the practice of restructurings, before and after the BRRD. We specifically discuss two cases (the resolution of Banco Popular Español and the liquidation of Italian “Banche Venete”) that, in our view, illustrate very well the pros and cons of the new regime. Part VI concludes offering some suggestions for possible reform.

The Data Standardization Challenge: Forthcoming in Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector : Ten Years After the Great Crash

Data standardization offers significant benefits for industry and regulators alike, suggesting that it should be easy. In practice, however, the process has been difficult and slow moving. Moving from an abstract incentive-based analysis to one focused on institutional detail reveals myriad frictions favoring the status quo despite foregone gains. This paper explores the benefits of and challenges confronting standardization, why it should be a top regulatory priority, and how to overcome some of the obstacles to implementation. The paper also uses data standardization as a lens into the challenges that impede optimal financial regulation. Alongside capture and other common explanations for regulatory failures, this paper suggests that coordination problems, delayed benefits, and other banal, but perhaps no less intractable, challenges are often the real impediments to better financial regulation.

Accounting for Financial Stability : Lessons from the Financial Crisis and Future Challenges

This paper investigates what we can learn from the financial crisis about the link between accounting and financial stability. The picture that emerges ten years after the crisis is substantially different from the picture that dominated the accounting debate during and shortly after the crisis. Widespread claims about the role of fair-value (or mark-to-market) accounting in the crisis have been debunked.

However, we identify several other core issues for the link between accounting and financial stability. Our analysis suggests that, going into the financial crisis, banks’ disclosures about relevant risk exposures were relatively sparse. Such disclosures came later after major concerns about banks’ exposures had arisen in markets. Similarly, banks delayed the recognition of loan losses. Banks’ incentives seem to drive this evidence, suggesting that reporting discretion and enforcement deserve careful consideration. In addition, bank regulation through its interlinkage with financial accounting may have dampened banks’ incentives for corrective actions. Our analysis illustrates that a number of serious challenges remain if accounting and financial reporting are to contribute to financial stability.


L’OEDF a pour objet de financer et de diffuser la recherche en droit financier et en finance, en encourageant tout projet d’intérêt général contribuant au débat public ou à la promotion de l’égalité des chances.

© 2020 Tous droits réservés - Mentions légales - Conçu par CONCILIUM - Crédits photographiques : Jérôme Aoustin


The objectives of the Centre are based around three key areas

Observing and analysing trends in the field of financial law
Forging connections between academic research and the business in an international context
Encouraging any projects of general interest contributing to the public debate

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